In multiparty presidential regimes, the head of the Executive manages a heterogeneous political base through a series of instruments. Among these tools, the use of patronage in appointments for governmental positions and the deployment of pork barrel to please congressional representatives have been highlighted by the literature as the glue that holds together multiparty coalitions. However, current studies neglect the role of politicians as active actors in multiparty presidential regimes in channeling resources to their constituencies and parties when holding a cabinet position. This paper contributes to the literature by merging these two tools of coalition maintenance. We analyze a complimentary strategy that benefits party leaders in the coalition by studying the relation of top-level cabinet appointments and grant transfers to subnational governments. Using data from Brazil, a paradigmatic case of multiparty presidential regime, we intend to answer the following question: Are ministries in Brazil being used to please ministers’ constituency and party allies? Using social networking analysis and econometrics for the period between 2011 and 2014, we provide evidence that ministers use their position to transfer funding to districts governed by fellow party members and not to their own political strongholds following a partisan pattern instead of a personal one.

A atividade empreendedora representa papel preponderante na dinâmica econômica de uma nação. Estudos anteriores afirmam que fatores institucionais estão correlacionados com a abertura de novos negócios, entretanto a literatura é divergente quanto ao efeito da corrupção burocrática sobre o empreendedorismo. Desse modo, o presente estudo tem por objetivo verificar a relação entre empreendedorismo e corrupção burocrática, tendo como base os estados brasileiros e Distrito Federal, para o período de 2000 a 2008. Adota-se o termo empreendedorismo como o ato de abrir uma nova empresa, como em Say (1816), Mescon e Montanari (1981) e Lachman (1980). A principal hipótese é que a abertura de empresas nos estados brasileiros é afetada negativamente pela incidência da corrupção. Através do método de regressão com dados em painel, foram estimados os modelos com dados agrupados e com efeitos fixos e aleatórios. Para mensurar a corrupção, utilizou-se o Índice Geral da Corrupção de Boll (2010) para os estados brasileiros e, para representar o empreendedorismo, a abertura de empresas per capita por estado. Os testes de Chow (1960), Hausman (1978) e Breusch e Pagan (1979) apontam que o modelo de efeitos aleatórios é o mais apropriado e seus resultados indicam uma correlação positiva entre o índice de corrupção e a abertura de empresas, contrariando as evidências empíricas encontradas em trabalhos anteriores realizados para o Brasil.

Entrepreneurial activity performs an important role in a nation's economic dynamics. Previous studies argue that institutional factors are correlated with the opening of new businesses, however, the literature is divergent as to the effect of bureaucratic corruption on entrepreneurship. Thus, this article aims to investigate the relationship between entrepreneurship and the incidence of bureaucratic corruption in Brazilian states and its Federal District (Brasilia), for the period of 2000-2008. This study's main hypothesis is that opening a business in Brazilian states is negatively affected by the incidence of corruption. Using a regression method with panel data, we estimated models with pooled data and fixed and random effects. The term entrepreneurship is adopted as the act of starting a new business, as in Say (1816), Mescon and Montanari (1981) and Lachman (1980). To measure corruption, we used the General Index of Corruption for Brazilian states (Boll, 2010), and to represent entrepreneurship, we used firm entry per capita by state. Tests of the Chow (1960), Hausman (1978) e Breusch and Pagan (1979) indicate that the random effects model is more appropriate, and the results indicate a positive correlation between bureaucratic corruption and entrepreneurial activity, contradicting the hypothesis expected and found in previous articles about Brazil.